Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research
Record date: 2025-05-08
( printed page 19611) Executive Order 14292 of May 5, 2025 Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered: Section 1 . Purpose. Dangerous gain-of-function research on biological agents and pathogens has the potential to significantly endanger the lives of American citizens. If left unrestricted, its effects can include widespread mortality, an impaired public health system, disrupted American livelihoods, and diminished economic and national security. The
What this record contains
- Federal Register document
- 2025-08266
- Publication date
- 2025-05-08
- Citation
- 90 FR 19611
- Issuing office
- Executive Office of the President
Official record excerpt
( printed page 19611) Executive Order 14292 of May 5, 2025 Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered: Section 1 . Purpose. Dangerous gain-of-function research on biological agents and pathogens has the potential to significantly endanger the lives of American citizens. If left unrestricted, its effects can include widespread mortality, an impaired public health system, disrupted American livelihoods, and diminished economic and national security. The Biden Administration allowed dangerous gain-of-function research within the United States with insufficient levels of oversight. It also actively approved, through the National Institutes of Health, Federal life-science research funding in China and other countries where there is limited United States oversight or reasonable expectation of biosafety enforcement. This recklessness, if unaddressed, may lead to the proliferation of research on pathogens (and potential pathogens) in settings without adequate safeguards, even after COVID-19 revealed the risk of such practices. Sec. 2 . Policy. It is the policy of the United States to ensure that United States federally funded research benefits American citizens without jeopardizing our Nation's security, strength, or prosperity. My Administration will balance the prevention of catastrophic consequences with maintaining readiness against biological threats and driving global leadership in biotechnology, biological countermeasures, biosecurity, and health research. Sec. 3 . Stop Dangerous Gain-of-Function Research. (a) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies) identified by the Director of OSTP, shall establish guidance for the heads of relevant agencies, to the extent consistent with the terms and conditions of the funding, to immediately: (i) end Federal funding of dangerous gain-of-function research conducted by foreign entities in countries of concern ( e.g., China) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6627(c) , or in other countries where there is not adequate oversight to ensure that the countries are compliant with United States oversight standards and policies; and (ii) end Federal funding of other life-science research that is occurring in countries of concern or foreign countries where there is not adequate oversight to ensure that the countries are compliant with United States oversight standards and policies and that could reasonably pose a threat to public health, public safety, and economic or national security, as determined by the heads of relevant agencies. (b) The Director of OSTP, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the APNSA, and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish guidance for the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other relevant agencies with respect to suspension of federally funded dangerous gain-of-function research, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the relevant research funding, at least until the ( printed page 19612) completion of the policy called for in section 4(a) of this order. Heads of agencies shall report any exception to a suspension to the Director of OSTP for review in consultation with the APNSA and the heads of relevant agencies. Sec. 4 . Secure Future Research Through Commonsense Frameworks. (a) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6627 and in coordination with the APNSA and the heads of relevant agencies, shall revise or replace the 2024 ” United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential ” to: (i) strengthen top-down independent oversight; increase accountability through enforcement, audits, and improved public transparency; and clearly define the scope of covered research while ensuring the United States remains the global leader in biotechnology, biological countermeasures, and health research; (ii) incorporate enforcement mechanisms, including those described in section 7 of this order, into Federal funding agreements to ensure compliance with all Federal policies governing dangerous gain-of-function research; and (iii) provide for review and revision at least every 4
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