Protecting the United States From Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Record date: 2021-01-22
( printed page 6821) Executive Order 13981 of January 18, 2021 Protecting the United States From Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that additional actions are necessary to ensure the security of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) owned, operated, and controlled by the Federal Government; to secure the integrity of American infrastructure, including America's National Airspace System (NAS); to protect our
What this record contains
- Federal Register document
- 2021-01646
- Publication date
- 2021-01-22
- Citation
- 86 FR 6821
- Issuing office
- Executive Office of the President
Official record excerpt
( printed page 6821) Executive Order 13981 of January 18, 2021 Protecting the United States From Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that additional actions are necessary to ensure the security of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) owned, operated, and controlled by the Federal Government; to secure the integrity of American infrastructure, including America's National Airspace System (NAS); to protect our law enforcement and warfighters; and to maintain and expand our domestic industrial base capabilities. Accordingly, I hereby order: Section 1 . Policy. UAS have tremendous potential to support public safety and national security missions and are increasingly being used by Federal, State, and local governments. UAS are used, for example, to assist law enforcement and support natural disaster relief efforts. Reliance on UAS and components manufactured by our adversaries, however, threatens our national and economic security. United States Government operations involving UAS require accessing, collecting, and maintaining data, which could reveal sensitive information. The use of UAS and critical components manufactured and developed by foreign adversaries, or by persons under their control, may allow this sensitive information to be accessed by or transferred to foreign adversaries. Furthermore, the manufacturing of UAS involves combining several critical components, including advanced manufacturing techniques, artificial intelligence, microelectronic components, and multi-spectral sensors. The Nation's capability to produce UAS and certain critical UAS components domestically is critical for national defense and the security and strength of our defense industrial base. It is the policy of the United States, therefore, to prevent the use of taxpayer dollars to procure UAS that present unacceptable risks and are manufactured by, or contain software or critical electronic components from, foreign adversaries, and to encourage the use of domestically produced UAS. Sec. 2 . Reviewing Federal Government Authority to Limit Government Procurement of Covered UAS. (a) The heads of all executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall review their respective authorities to determine whether, and to what extent consistent with applicable law, they could cease: (i) directly procuring or indirectly procuring through a third party, such as a contractor, a covered UAS; (ii) providing Federal financial assistance ( e.g., through award of a grant) that may be used to procure a covered UAS; (iii) entering into, or renewing, a contract, order, or other commitment for the procurement of a covered UAS; or (iv) otherwise providing Federal funding for the procurement of a covered UAS. (b) After conducting the review described in subsection (a) of this section, the heads of all agencies shall each submit a report to the Director of ( printed page 6822) the Office of Management and Budget identifying any authority to take the actions outlined in subsections (a)(i) through (iv) of this section. Sec. 3 . Reviewing Federal Government Use of UAS. (a) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the heads of all agencies shall each submit a report to the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy describing the manufacturer, model, and any relevant security protocols for all UAS currently owned or operated by their respective agency, or controlled by their agency through a third party, such as a contractor, that are manufactured by foreign adversaries or have significant components that are manufactured by foreign adversaries. (b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the heads of other agencies, as appropriate, shall review the reports required by subsection (a) of this section and submit a report to the President assessing the security risks posed by the existing Federal UAS fleet and outlining potential steps that could be taken to mitigate these risks, including, if warranted, discontinuing all Federal use of covered UAS and the expeditious removal of UAS from Federal service. Sec. 4 . Restricting Use of UAS On or Over Critical Infrastructure or Other Sensitive Sites. Within 270 days of the date of
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