Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, and Their Derivative Products Into the United States
Record date: 2026-01-20
( printed page 2443) Proclamation 11002 of January 14, 2026 Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, and Their Derivative Products Into the United States A Proclamation 1. On December 22, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his investigation into the effects of imports of semiconductors (semiconductors or chips), semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products on the national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862 (section 232). Based on the
What this record contains
- Federal Register document
- 2026-01052
- Publication date
- 2026-01-20
- Citation
- 91 FR 2443
- Issuing office
- Executive Office of the President
Official record excerpt
( printed page 2443) Proclamation 11002 of January 14, 2026 Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, and Their Derivative Products Into the United States A Proclamation 1. On December 22, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his investigation into the effects of imports of semiconductors (semiconductors or chips), semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products on the national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862 (section 232). Based on the facts considered in that investigation, and taking into account the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security and other relevant factors, see 19 U.S.C. 1862(d) , the Secretary found and advised me of his opinion that semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States. 2. The Secretary found that the present quantities and circumstances of imports of semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products pose a threat to the national security and economy. The United States' capacity to produce semiconductors, certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment such as advanced lithography and etching tools, and their derivative products is insufficient to meet domestic demand. This has led the United States to be dependent on foreign sources to meet domestic demand for semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and their derivative products. 3. The Secretary found that semiconductors are essential to the United States' economic, industrial, and military strength. Modern defense systems depend on high-performance semiconductors for radar and communication systems, electronic warfare and cybersecurity systems, and guidance and control systems for missiles and drones. Furthermore, defense systems often require specialized semiconductors that can withstand extreme environments. This reliance on semiconductors is expected only to increase. 4. The Secretary found that semiconductors are essential to each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified by National Security Memorandum 22 of April 30, 2024 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience). For example, the communications sector requires semiconductors for broadband networks, routing, switching, telecommunications infrastructure, smartphones, and satellite communications systems. The energy sector requires them for smart grid control and converter systems. Nuclear reactors use semiconductors for sensors and safety systems, control-rod-actuation systems, distributed control systems, and power-management systems. The medical sector uses semiconductors in its imaging systems, diagnostic-assay systems, robotic surgical systems, and in pacemakers and defibrillators. 5. The Secretary found that the United States' capacity to manufacture semiconductors is too low to meet projected national defense needs and to match the requirements of a growing commercial industry. The United ( printed page 2444) States consumes roughly one quarter of the world's semiconductors. The United States currently fully manufactures only approximately 10 percent of the chips it requires, making it heavily reliant on foreign supply chains. This dependence on foreign supply chains is a significant economic and national security risk. Given the foundational role that semiconductors play in the modern economy and national defense, a disruption of import-reliant supply chains could strain the United States' industrial and military capabilities. 6. The Secretary found that semiconductors that enable artificial intelligence (AI) are an important element of many data centers currently in use, such that the importation in current quantities and circumstances poses a threat to the national security, when such importation does not contribute to the buildout of the United States technology supply chain. 7. In light of these findings, the Secretary recommended a two-phase plan of action to adjust imports of semiconductors so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States. In the first phase, the United States would continue ongoing trade negotiations with foreign jurisdictions that have the potential to strengthen the United States semiconductor industry. The Secretary also recommended, as part of this first phase, immediately imposing a 25 percent ad valorem tariff on a very narrow category of semiconductors that are an important element of my Administration's AI and technology policies, and that such tariff would not apply when the chips are imported to support the buildout of the United States technology supply chain. In the
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Questions for accountability
- Which products, countries and tariff rates were affected?
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- Did later orders, courts or negotiations change the policy?
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